This paper uses micro data from the 1998-99 Indian Time Use Survey 593 persons in 18,591 households in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Orissa and Haryana) to examine the relative quantitative importance of social capital and of inequality in land ownership and caste status in determining whether a household will have to collect water. The paper argues that time use data provides a natural metric for measuring 'social capital' building activities, and for distinguishing between 'bonding' into groups or 'bridging' within communities. In India, the probability that a rural household fetches water decreases by 15.7% and 7.4% respectively when the average time spent on social interaction and communitybased activities at the district level doubles, but it increases by 19.2% when the time in groupbased activities doubles. Inequalities in income, land ownership and home ownership are associated with considerably larger differences in local tap water availability.
Social Capital and Basic Goods:
The Cautionary Tale of Drinking Water in India Human survival requires water to drink, and for sanitation and food preparation. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 1992) Why do they now not have the access that most people in India take for granted? This paper begins in Section 1 with an overview of water collection in India and a brief description of our data source: the Indian Time Use Survey of 1998-99. Section 2 develops a simple model of water provision whose main feature is inequality in net individual benefits from collective water supply and the potential role played by social capital in helping solve the problem of organizing collective action. Section 3 then suggests that a natural metric for local social capital building activities might be the average amount of time that local residents spend in social interaction, group or community activities, and examines the relative importance for the supply of water of community and group level social capital and of inequality in land and in caste. Section 4 concludes.
Overview

Basic Needs and the Time Burden of Carrying Water
Although the Human Poverty Index of the UNDP includes, as one of its components, the percentage of the population 4 "without sustainable access to an improved water source", it goes on to define "reasonable access" as "the availability of at least 20 litres a person per day from a source within 1 kilometre of the user's dwelling". As any reader can easily check, carrying this amount of water for a four person family (i.e. 80 litres per day) is hard work 5 -and a return journey of up to two kilometres takes significant time. If there is no community provision, the affluent can often afford to dig their own private wells, so it is the poor -i.e. poor women (this is a highly gendered task) -who may have to spend a significant part of every day carrying water. The construction and maintenance of public water distribution infrastructure requires community organization and the literature on social capital stresses the facilitating role of social interaction and group membership for that community organization -but the fact that the affluent do not have to carry water is likely to be crucially important in determining their support. Analysis of the time people spend carrying water therefore raises, in a very concrete way, some central concerns about inequality, gender, public goods provision and social capital in the development process.
Data Description
Between June, 1998 and July, 1999, the Central Statistical Organization of India conducted a pilot Time Use Survey (the ITUS). As Pandey (1999) describes, a stratified random sampling design, as followed in the National Sample Surveys (NSS), was used to select 1066 rural and 488 urban strata of small, medium and large rural villages and urban towns within 52 (out of 147) separate districts in 6 states. In each First Stage Unit, 12 randomly selected households were interviewed, producing a sample of 18,591 households (12,750 rural and 5,841 urban) with 77,593 persons (53,981 rural and 23,612 urban). The survey was conducted in four rounds during the year to capture seasonal variations in the time use patterns of the population.
Two person teams of male and female interviewers stayed in each village or urban block for nine days to compile time diaries for normal, abnormal and weekly variant days. Respondent households were first visited to assess their weekly pattern of time use and then revisited to complete a full diary of activities concerning the previous day for all household members aged six years or older. Although the sample design was explicitly constructed to capture differences in time use between normal and weekly variant or abnormal 6 days, in practice Hirway (2000, 24) noted that "On an average, of the total 7 days, 6.51 were normal, 0.44 weekly variant day and 0.05 was abnormal day… in rural areas people continue their normal activities on holidays also." This paper therefore focuses on time use on "normal" days.
As Pandey (1999, 1) noted: "India has lot of socio-economic, demographic, geographic and cultural diversities. To ensure that all aspects of diversities are captured, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Meghalaya were chosen to represent northern, central, western, eastern, southern and north-eastern regions respectively." Although one might wonder whether six states' data could fully capture the diversity of India, Hirway (2000, 11) has argued "cross-checking of the results has confirmed that the sample is fairly representative of the country." In any event, this data would be interesting even if this were not the case, i.e. even if the data were only seen as a sample of the approximately 233 million people inhabiting these states.
Paid collection of water is a very minor phenomenon in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas only 1.2% of water collection time was paid, and in urban areas only about 1.4%. Just 0.13% (0.17%) of rural (urban) households that collect water do so only for payment. 7 In the analysis below, we therefore ignore the issue of paid water collection. Figure 1 plots the distribution of total water collection time in the households which have to collect water in rural and urban areas -throughout this paper we examine rural and urban areas separately. We can see that both in rural and urban areas, there is a wide variation in the times that households spend on collecting water. that if a household has to collect water, a particular type of person will do it. Given that an individual belongs to a certain category (e.g. a boy), we compute the probability that he/she collects water. We then normalize this by dividing it with the probability that any individual collects water -hence the interpretation of relative probability or a ratio of probabilities. Clearly, "carrying water" is a heavily gendered task -Columns R1 and U1 indicate that in both the rural and urban areas of India, adult women do about 87% of this kind of work, while Columns R2 and U2 show that, in households which have to fetch water, the frequency of water collection by adult women is twice as high as the average probability of collecting water. 8
Columns R3 and U3 report the average time spent in a normal day by people who have to collect water. For those people who have to do it, carrying water is clearly a significant task. As column R3 shows, gender inequity is greater among adults than among children -on average rural women who fetch water spend more time (47 minutes daily) than rural men (40 minutes), but boys (48 minutes) and girls (50 minutes) have a more similar average task. In the sample, in urban areas, 11.5% of households collect water, compared to 18.6% of rural households (translating to 16% (9.6%) of rural (urban) Indian households), but for those households which do have to collect water, Table 1 indicates that there are relatively small urban/rural differences in the distribution and difficulty of this task (except for girls).
Table 1 also indicates that intra-household gender differences in the burden of water collection are much larger than between-household differences associated with other characteristics -like caste status, land or homestead ownership, occupation or gender of household head. With the exception of Scheduled Tribes 9 status, the relative probabilities of water collection (R2 and U2) and average daily time (R3 and U3) diverge somewhat, in the expected directions, but gender differences are clearly largest in magnitude.
A Simple Model of the Supply of Tap Water
Wherever they live, humans must have some source of water -what determines whether the infrastructure to deliver water is constructed or whether households have to carry water from whatever source exists? Water is not a classic "public good" since it is both rival in consumption and excludable in access. But because wells, reservoirs, piping and other water production facilities have significant indivisibilities and economies of scale 10 and since efficient distribution of water often requires piping or aqueducts which might cross many individuals' properties, in most countries the public sector is deeply involved in provision of water infrastructure 11 .
In affluent nations, tap water supply is nearly universal, but, as mentioned above, in developing countries like India a significant proportion of households do not have access to tap water supply. Piped water delivery requires the construction of distribution facilities that in India are often far beyond the means of individual households. In addition to the fixed cost of pumping stations and the marginal costs of piping and maintenance, there is a cost to the negotiations required to arrange construction and the rights of way needed for water distribution -negotiations which are more difficult because the benefits of piped water are unequally distributed.
For a simple model to capture the inequality of net benefits in water distribution, we start by abstracting from the specificities of geography and assuming that a point source of watere.g. a well with finite capacity -now serves a population that is uniformly distributed on a featureless plain. Suppose that this well can supply N households spread uniformly over a radius D from the well head. Since each individual household is located at a given distance from the well, line OC in Figure 2 plots the cost in time and effort of collecting water from the well for household i with opportunity cost of time w i as a fixed time cost of filling containers (w i c) and a linear function of distance (w i d i ). We assume that the technology of tap water supply is characterized by the fixed cost of digging a well and maintaining a pumping station, whose .
The average total technical cost (ATTC) of water supply per household is given by:
The point of Figure 2 is to illustrate a dilemma in piped water systems. The benefit to an individual household of the piped water system is the value of time saved (w i c+w i d i ), which varies with distance from the wellhead (d i ) and opportunity cost of time (w i ). Households located close to a point source of water have the least to gain from piped water supply, because their current time costs of carrying water are smaller -indeed Figure 2 is meant to illustrate the (extreme) case where those closest to the water source are unwilling to pay even the marginal cost of connection. However, more distant households can only connect at the marginal cost of service (b 1 ) if the pipe system already serves those of their neighbours who are nearer the source.
The household's opportunity cost of time (w i ) depends upon their human capital stock.
There is also a pure wealth effect (e.g. from land ownership) on w i , via the income elasticity of demand for leisure, conditional on human capital. For an individual household, the cost of digging a private well sufficient for the household's own use is plausibly less than the fixed cost of a well and pumping station big enough for the local district, but even if it is not, for sufficiently large values of w i , one will observe (w i c+w i d i ) > b 0 . Although collective provision at an average total cost of (b 0 + b 1 D)/N would usually be cheaper than self provision, if collective provision cannot be arranged, the affluent will find it worthwhile to dig their own private wells.
A pure market based system of water supply could involve a very complicated game of bluff, hold-up and reneging on contracts 12 . Since no agent would otherwise make irrevocable fixed cost investments in facilities and piping, some credible institutions for the enforcement of long term contracts would be needed. Substantial transactions costs in bilateral monopoly/ monopsony bargaining would also be incurred if each household were to buy from their upstream neighbour and then try to exploit their market power over downstream neighbours. The non-existence of long term contract enforcement institutions is arguably a crucial part of the development problem -but even in highly developed market systems, the provision of water to households is usually done by public utilities, or under strict public regulation.
Organizing collective action faces, however, the problem that inequality in the net benefits of a piped water system is inherent, since the opportunity cost of not having a water distribution system depends on the distance water must otherwise be carried and is accentuated by any inequality in the opportunity cost of time w -which will vary with household wealth, in both human capital and land ownership. As well, if water carrying is a gendered task and if the benefits of piped water in saved labour are received by women while the cash costs of municipal water rates are paid partly by men, inequality in power within households will affect the perceived net benefits of the family patriarch, who may be the relevant "voter".
Even if all individuals realize that there are economies of scale in water supply that imply a net surplus is created by joint action, will households co-operate in the collective provision of water? Institutions (like water supply authorities) do not drop without cost from the sky. A costly process of negotiation is necessary, which is larger if interests diverge and tends to be more protracted if mutual trust is absent. We presume that the total cost of negotiation depends multiplicatively on both the total absolute difference between residents in the net benefits they will receive from the water system [
] and the level of mutual mistrust.
If we summarize "mistrust" as a parameter b 2 , Equation 3 expresses the total cost of water supply (TC) as the sum of the technical and negotiation costs -i.e. fixed costs (b 0 ) and variable costs of connection (b 1 D) plus negotiation costs.
[3]
Average costs of piped water supply (ATC) are then given by Equation 4 13 . If the crucial issue for political support of a water authority is whether or not the critical voter is better off (i.e. whether ATC < OC), this implies that the important variables are the fixed cost of supply and the degree of inequality in the benefits of piped water and of mistrust.
Why do some households have to collect water?
The question "Why do some households in India have to collect water?" has two components: 1] Why do some localities have tap water while others do not? 2] Why, when local facilities exist, do some households not benefit, because they are not connected to the local water distribution system?
In our data, we observe the likelihood that a particular household will have to spend time fetching water -a compound probability equal to one minus the product of the probability [P 1 ] that tap water is available from a local well or pipe system and the conditional probability [P 2 ] that the household can connect to the local distribution system, if it exists. We want to examine the characteristics of communities that determine the local availability of drinking water and the characteristics of households that determine access to locally available supplies. We expect the probability of tap water availability to depend negatively on average total cost, so that (writing σ for a measure of inequality in the opportunity cost of time w i ) one would expect:
[5]
Isham and Kähkönen (2002) have also emphasized the benefits of village level social capital for the effective design, implementation and maintenance of rural water projects in rural India and Sri Lanka. The impacts of greater mistrust (b 2 ) on costs of water provision may therefore enter via multiple paths -in higher initial negotiation costs and in increasing the fixed and variable technical costs of water supply (b 0 and b 1 ) (also see Isham and Kähkönen (1999) on water in Java). In equation [5] , the technical costs of water provision (summarized in b 0 , b 1 D) and the levels of mistrust (b 2 ) and inequality (σ) are characteristics of the community. Whether an individual household can connect to an available local network depends on their household disposable income (y i ), and on whether they are a member of a socially excluded group (S i ), which implies the conditional probability of tap water access as in [6] and the compound probability of fetching water as in [7] .
Social Capital, Other Community Characteristics and Access to Water
In recent years, a vast (and much contested) literature 14 has stressed the importance of local "social capital" for the organization of co-operative action -either in direct voluntary supply of local infrastructure or in the mobilization of political pressure which produces government action. The World Bank's website on Social Capital states:
"Social Capital refers to the norms and networks that enable collective action. It encompasses institutions, relationships, and customs that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social capital is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable.
Social capital, when enhanced in a positive manner, can improve project effectiveness and sustainability by building the community's capacity to work together to address their common needs, fostering greater inclusion and cohesion, and increasing transparency and accountability 15 ."
Putnam has variously defined "social capital" as "connections among individuals -social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (2000, 19) or as "features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1993). For Woolcock and Narayan (2000, 227)
"social capital refers to the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively".
Phrased in this way, "social capital" sounds inherently positive, but many authors have noted that norms and networks are specific to particular cultures and historical periods, implying that "social capital" and associational life can be either positive or negative in its implications for development. Norms and networks can "bond" individuals into mutually exclusionary, divisive, small social groups or "bridge" social groups and thereby link individuals within the wider society. Ethnic and religious tensions which undermine development may be partly the product of strong within group bonding, as well as dysfunctionally high inter-group mistrust -the that Tanzanian villages in which individuals belonged to more groups were also richer (and that the relationship was causal) 16 . However, if "Associational life" is measured by membership counts (by, for example, asking respondents: "Are you, or is someone in your household, a member of any groups, organizations or associations 17 ?"), it is not obvious how to aggregate memberships. The raw number of associational memberships is an index which weights equally intensive and marginal involvements of individuals, and which does not differentiate the purposes and types of associations -but index numbers with arbitrary aggregation properties 18 may produce econometrically fragile results.
As well, both "trust" and associational membership may be important inputs into "norms and networks", but neither is a direct measurement of them. 19 'Trust' (like "politeness") is an aspect of interpersonal attitudes and relationships. Associational memberships are a proxy for a person's number of social contacts. Both may facilitate co-operation in networks, and may possibly help to sustain norms of behaviour, but neither directly measure "norms and networks".
In this paper, we suggest that time might be, in many ways, a natural metric for social (Note that the impossibility of distinguishing between informal "talking", "gossiping" or the locus within which social capital will have its impact (or not). We also therefore focus on inequality at the district level (in land and expenditure) -decomposing it into between village and within village components and separately assessing their impacts. Our results are essentially similar even if we use the village/urban block instead of the district. 28 We present all these specifications because we want to examine the robustness of our results. Qualitatively, there are only a few differences in sign or statistical significance to note.
Looking first at individual characteristics, the tendency of economists is to think of price and income effects as possible explanatory variables in predicting household demand for a service (such as tap water) -but the size of such effects, relative to the influence of other possible explanatory variables, is an empirical issue. The ITUS data does not contain any direct measurement of the money price of water but hook-up charges or local taxes to defray distribution costs may still imply that "ability to pay" could be a significant barrier to having tap water, even where it is locally available.
In both urban and rural areas, the household's monthly per capita expenditure is highly statistically significant 32 and negatively associated with having to fetch water, with a similar size coefficient in urban and rural areas. 33 Moreover, one could arguably expect wealth and not income to be the more important individual household determinant of access to tap water. The negative coefficient on "professional" household status, predicting the probability of fetching water, may reflect human capital wealth, and the positive association with greater number of dependents is also consistent with this interpretation. However, in rural areas, the statistical insignificance of landlessness, home ownership and a dummy variable "laborer" (indicating that more than 50% of income is from agricultural or other labour status) can be read as indicating that these variables have little additional explanatory power in rural areas that is not already captured in monthly expenditure. These results contrast with the urban evidence of positive Deleted: consistently and
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Deleted: significant correlation of laborer status and water carrying and the negative coefficient on home ownership status (both are highly statistically significant). Hence, we have some evidence for a greater relative impact of "ability to pay" as a determinant of lack of access to tap water in urban, compared to rural areas. Notably, there is no evidence in either urban or rural areas for discrimination in water access against female headed households.
Whether or not citizens can mobilize effectively for collective action, the cost of provision depends on how easily local wells can be dug to access water. 34 National water resources data 35 provide estimates of replenishable ground water reserves per capita in different states, and in both urban and rural areas this proxy for technical cost of supply has the expected negative sign, is stable in empirical magnitude and is highly statistically significant in all specifications. 36 Given the technical cost of water facilities, provision will be more likely where cooperative action can be more readily organized -this paper attempts to assess the relative quantitative importance of social interaction, and of the type of social interaction, compared to the structural barriers of caste and class. The novelty in time use data is its direct observation of time spent in social interaction, whose impacts can be compared in magnitude to those of inequality in land ownership, income and caste status.
The social capital perspective on local public goods provision implies that a household's probability of having to fetch water will be higher where there is greater economic inequality in wealth or patterns of residential mobility. It appears that ethnic diversity has an independent (negative) impact on the likelihood that communities can organize collectively to improve their welfare."
The innovation in the social capital approach is its optimistic perspective that social interaction can create networks of mutual trust and thereby facilitate co-operative action, given the structural divisions of ethnicity, class and caste. However, when we added together the time spent in both community and group activities, we got the results reported in Model B. Contrary to the social capital model, time spent on community and group activities is highly statistically significant (statistically significant in urban areas) and positively associated with having to fetch water -i.e. is negatively associated with local public goods provision. Only when the impacts of community work and group activities are examined separately does it become clear that associational life within groups has a very different correlation with development in India than wider community involvement. In Model C in Table 3 , for both rural and urban areas, the average time spent by local men in community work (i.e. mostly by other local men) is negatively associated with a household's having to fetch water but the coefficient on time spent in group activities is highly statistically significant and positive -a result which we take to indicate the possible importance of "bonding" within narrow in-groups defined by occupation, caste and class. Apparently, not all forms of associational life are necessarily correlated with development. 37 In the Indian context, caste activities are a form of associational life that is by its nature exclusionary. The ITUS specifically asked respondents about their involvement in caste groups (activity code 651). Since politics in India (especially rural India) is strongly influenced by caste affiliations, caste also plays a role in participation in political and civic activities (activity code Deleted: stron
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Deleted: (at 1%) Deleted: in all specifications 661). While caste based associational life may build strong bonds within the caste-group, the counterpart of that within-group solidarity may be schisms and mistrust within the larger society. 38 Our results on the negative impacts of time spent in group activity in India are therefore consistent with the many studies 39 that have found that ethno-linguistic fragmentation leads to lower or inferior provision of public goods and to lower growth. However, although our results using this Indian data can be seen as a cautionary counter-example to the hypothesis that more associational life and a more active "civic society" are necessarily and unambiguously a "good thing", we do not mean to imply that "group" activities are inherently divisive. Our argument is that such activity is historically and culturally specific in its implications for social capital. We note that the associational life which Narayan and Pritchett (1999a, 1999b) found to be so positive in Tanzania was the associational life of a society which developed a unique model of rural ujamaa socialism in the late 1960s, which was itself based on earlier traditions of mutual help and a lack of local class distinctions in rural areas (Nyerere 1968). Hence, we see no contradiction in finding that group activity in a different cultural context, at a different time, has a different impact on social capital and development. Table 3 indicates that in rural areas both average time spent in social engagements and in casual "talking, gossiping, quarrelling" are highly statistically significant, and negatively correlated with having to fetch water -but things are different in urban areas. The coefficients on casual social interaction and social activities are much smaller than those on community work, but all these variables are highly statistically significant and negatively associated with the probability that rural Indian households will have to fetch water -which is consistent with Deleted: negatively and
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Putnam's perspective on the positive social externalities of social interaction and with the World Bank's recent emphasis on "social capital" in development. Table 3 indicates that in both urban and rural areas, the percentage of the local population that is scheduled caste or scheduled tribe is generally highly positively correlated with the probability a household will have to fetch water. Given that the locality has piped water, there is some evidence for individual level discrimination against scheduled tribes (in models B and C in rural areas) but no evidence for individual level discrimination against scheduled castes (indeed Table 3 shows an anomalous negative association between scheduled caste and fetching water in urban areas). Since a decision to allocate priority in water supply infrastructure construction between villages can be buried within the bureaucracy while a decision to deny connection rights to an existing system within a village is more obvious, it is quite plausible that district governments may discriminate between localities, even if village officials face more constraints in discriminating between individuals.
Because land ownership is a meaningful indicator of wealth inequality in rural, but not urban areas, this variable appears only in the first three columns of Table 3 . A robust result is that the percentage of landless households is highly statistically significant and positively associated with the chance a given household (landless or not) will have to fetch water. 40 However, statistical significance does not necessarily imply quantitative importance.
Furthermore, the marginal impact of each independent variable, considered separately, may sometimes be a misleading guide to policy impacts -e.g. land redistribution would affect both the percentage of landless households and the inequality of land ownership among the landed.
Table 4 therefore presents the difference in probability of having to fetch water associated with alternative "ceteris paribus" type thought experiments. 41 We compute the probability of fetching
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Deleted: stron water for the same base household that we considered earlier in table 3. To simulate the impact of various policies, we recalculate this probability appropriately. water. As noted earlier, districts with more community time have less water carrying, but districts with more group activity time have more water carrying. However, a doubling of community organized work is only associated with about 7% decrease in water-carrying chances while the same proportionate change in group activities has a much stronger opposite effect -an increase of 19% (rural) or 12% (urban). In general, the large changes in social interaction patterns simulated in Table 4 are associated with impacts substantially less than the impacts of caste differentials and those associated with inequality in land ownership in rural areas and home ownership in urban areas.
Since some individual attributes can be thought of as a 'package' -e.g. acquiring professional status, having a higher income and buying a home -it may also be more realistic to examine their joint impacts. In urban areas, these three individual household attributes jointly account entirely for the probability of fetching water -but in rural areas they only explain about a fifth of the probability, implying that community characteristics retain a dominant role. Our results are therefore consistent with the view that some types of social interaction may help, while caste-based group activities may hurt, but it is economic inequalities and caste based social divisions that are crucial to the social co-operation which is the basis for local public goods supply in India. In urban areas, individual economic advantage, as indicated by income, home ownership and professional occupational status, is the key to whether or not a household has to collect water, while the inequality of land ownership is crucial in rural areas.
Conclusions
This paper has used time diary data to measure social interactions and has compared the relative empirical importance of 'social capital' and of inequality in land ownership and caste in determining the probability that an Indian household will have to fetch water. We interpret our results to indicate that although the recent literature on "social capital" has provided important insights into the development process, the cleavages of caste and class are fundamental, in the Indian context -as the early literature on Indian economic development emphasized.
Our evidence on gendered inequality in carrying water and documentation of the importance of inequalities of caste and class in India may not be surprising. However, we also hope to have provided a cautionary counter-example to possibly excessive optimism that the growth of "civic society" is necessarily positive for development. Whether "social capital" is positive or negative for development -bridging social divides or bonding agents within preexisting social groups -is an empirical issue, which depends on the specific historical context. In other contexts, time spent in group activities may build trust among individuals across society, enabling more effective collective action which improves basic public services, like the delivery of water. However, in the specific context of India, our results indicate that it is more likely that many group activities reinforce the importance of pre-existing social cleavages (like caste), exacerbate the negative impact of inequalities in land ownership, professional status and income and undermine the likelihood of community level collective action that might improve community well-being -particularly the well-being of poor women -by relieving people of the continuing daily drudgery of fetching water. Note. -Columns R1-R3, U1-U3 refer to households where some one fetches water on a normal day; R1 and U1: Total time spent on fetching water on a normal day by individuals belonging to a particular category (e.g. boys aged 6-14) as a percentage of the total time spent by all individuals on a normal day on fetching water; R2 and U2 = p 1 /p 2 , where p 1 -percentage of individuals who belong to a particular category who fetch water on a normal day (e.g. boys who fetch water on a normal day as a percentage of the number of boys in households in which water is collected on a normal day) and p 2 -individuals who fetch water on a normal day, expressed as a percentage of the total number of individuals who live in households in which water is collected on a normal day; R3 and U3: Average minutes per normal day spent in water collection, calculated over those individuals who spend some time on a normal day fetching water; POP -population percentages for all respondents aged 6 and above in both water-carrying and non water-carrying households. 
X is the vector of explanatory variables with values corresponding to the base household, βˆ is the vector of estimated coefficients (including the intercept) and f is the density function for the standard normal. Interested readers can refer to the URL: http://economics.dal.ca/Research/Research_Papers_in_Economics/index.php for the estimated coefficients, standard errors and computation of marginal effects. b) For the probit, the dependent variable: =1 if a household fetches water, = 0 if not; Number of households that fetch water in rural and urban areas are 2363 (18.58%) and 671 (11.51%), respectively. The sample size for the rural (urban) regressions viz., 12720 (5830) is less than the number of rural (urban) households in the survey 12750 (5841) because we removed a few outliers and erroneous records. For the bootstrap, the number of replications: 1000. We report the p-values in parentheses.
c) The Theil index of inequality (R) can be written as (W+B) where the within component is: We compute the probability of fetching water for a base household (nonscheduled caste, non-scheduled tribe, male headed, with average monthly per-capita expenditure and dependency ratio. The household lives in a district with average values for all the district-level variablesinequality, scheduled caste proportion, scheduled tribe proportion etc.). In rural areas, the base case is landless, laborer and homestead owning, whereas in urban areas it is not homestead owning and neither laborer nor professional.
To simulate the impact of land redistribution in rural areas, we recalculate this probability by setting the landless proportion and the Theil among the landed to zero and making the household landed (i.e. not a laborer). In simulation (v) we change several variables simultaneously -other simulations are "ceteris paribus". . Since this bias has an indeterminate amount of random error, it is best to use bˆ as the point estimate of b (rather than * b , which is the bias subtracted from b ). There are three methods that can be used to compute )% 1 ( α − confidence intervals for b: (i) Normal approximation, (ii) Percentile, and (iii) Bias Corrected. In (i) the assumption is that the sampling (and thereby the bootstrapping) distribution is normal. In (ii) the confidence interval is constructed based upon percentiles of the bootstrapping distribution. The computations for (iii) are more involved and for details, see the references cited, which also present formulae for (i) and (ii). In the bootstrapped regressions that we perform (reported in Tables 3 and 4) the biases are small and the above three methods yield approximately the same results. Bias estimates and confidence intervals are available upon request. 30 For the coefficients and standard errors of the probit models reported in Table 3 , see http://economics.dal.ca/Research/Research_Papers_in_Economics/index.php where an Excel file also enables readers to calculate the marginal effects associated with alternative possible hypothetical base cases. 31 Except activity code 611 (community organized construction and repairs) which includes work on 'roads, dams, wells, ponds, etc.' 32 We use the terms highly statistically significant, strongly statistically significant and statistically significant to refer to statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Unless otherwise stated, we refer to model C.
Appendix
